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CHANDRAN KUKATHAS
10 Hayek and liberalism
In particular you should not assume that in times of crisis
exceptions should be made to principles
– F.A. Hayek, ‘‘The Rediscovery of Freedom’’
F.A. Hayek occupies a peculiar place in the history of twentieth-
century liberalism. His influence has, in many respects, been enor-
mous. The Road to Serfdom, his first political work, not only
attracted popular attention in the west but also circulated widely
(in samizdat form) in the intellectual underground of Eastern Europe
during the years between the end of the war and the revolutions of
1989. His critique of central planning has been thoroughly vindi-
cated, if not by the demise of communist economic systems, then
at least by the recognition by socialists of many stripes of the
importance of market processes.1 Books and articles on his thought
continue to appear and there is plenty of evidence that his ideas are
widely discussed in Europe, South America, and even in the United
States. Hayek’s political influence has been no less remarkable.
He persuaded Antony Fisher to abandon his plans for a political
career and to devote himself instead to establishing an organiza-
tion for the dissemination of classical liberal ideas. The Institute of
Economic Affairs founded by Fisher not only played an important role
in changing the policymaking climate in Britain but also became the
model for many classical liberal ‘‘think-tanks’’ around the world. But
Hayek also influenced political leaders and activists more directly
through his writings and public speeches,2 and also through personal
correspondence. By any reasonable standard, Hayek has been a signi-
ficant public intellectual whose influence has roamed across the
disciplines of social science into the realms of public policy.
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Yet in spite of all this, Hayek is also a figurewho has gone unrecog-
nized by most contemporary political theorists as a contributor to
liberal thought – or indeed to political thought – in the twentieth
century. His work has not attracted commentary of the quality
or quantity of that elicited by the work of John Rawls. One is
unlikely to see university courses on Hayek’s political thought and,
as likely as not, his name will fail to appear in books and papers
discussing issues in liberal political theory. In the academic main-
stream of contemporary political theory, Hayek is a marginal figure.
In Rawls’ work, including Political Liberalism (Rawls 1993), Hayek
does not rate a mention; nor are Hayek’s ideas and concerns
addressed in any of the major critiques of liberalism which have
appeared over the last three decades.3
All this raises a number of questions about Hayek and modern
liberalism.Why hasHayek not been takenmore seriously bymodern
liberals or by their critics? Is Hayek in fact an important figure in
twentieth-century liberalism and, if he is, what has been his contri-
bution? What, in the end, is Hayek’s liberal legacy? My purpose here
is to show that Hayek has something important to contribute to
liberal thought in the twentieth century. To do this I begin, in the
first section, with a brief account of the fundamental tenets of
Hayek’s liberalism. I then turn, in the second section, to explain
how Hayek came to this liberalism and how the genesis of Hayek’s
commitment to liberal ideals shaped the development of his political
thinking. The third section examines modern liberal theory more
broadly conceived and tries to explain what have been its primary
concerns (and presuppositions), particularly since the work of John
Rawls. This should afford us a firm base from which to look at why
Hayek and contemporary liberal theory have failed to engage one
another. From here I shall turn, in the fifth section, to broach more
directly the question of what Hayek has to offer.
HAYEK’S LIBERALISM
Hayek’s liberalism is best understood as a response to socialism. The
distinctive feature of socialism, in his understanding, is its aspiration
to organize society in accordance with some common purpose. What
he finds implausible about the socialist ideal is the thought that
attempts at such organization will achieve their purported goals.
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What he finds objectionable about socialism is that it is incompatible
with individual freedom as he understands it.
Implicit in all this are two assumptions, which Hayek has tried to
bring out explicitly in his social and political philosophy. First, order
is possible without design or central command. Hayek, more than
any other thinker in this century (with the possible exception of
Ludwig von Mises), attempted to show the feasibility of a social
order understood as a means-connected system without a common
hierarchy of ultimate ends.4 Indeed, Hayek has gone further, arguing
that demands for conscious control or direction of social processes
can never be met and that attempts to gain control or to direct social
development can only result in the loss of liberty and, ultimately, in
the destruction of civilizations. In some respects, Hayek’s theory
here is not especially novel: he offers an account of invisible-hand
processes which Mandeville, Hume, and Adam Smith had identified
as crucial to the understanding of social order as the undesigned
product of human interaction. Hayek’s distinctive contribution is
his account of social institutions and rules of conduct as bearers of
knowledge. Society may profitably be viewed as a network of practi-
ces and traditions of behavior that convey information guiding indi-
vidual conduct. These institutions not only facilitate the matching
of means with established ends, but also stimulate the discovery of
human ends. Hayek’s argument is that it is vital that society not be
brought under the governance of a single conception of the ends of
life which is held to subsume all the various purposes human beings
pursue, for this can only stifle the transmission and growth of
knowledge.
The second assumption underlying Hayek’s political philosophy
is that individual freedom is not to be understood in terms of man’s
capacity to control his circumstances, nor in terms of collective self-
government. Rather, freedom obtains when the individual enjoys a
protected sphere or domain within which others may not interfere,
and he may engage in his separate pursuits in accordance with his
own purposes.
This liberalism stands in clear contrast to the socialism of Karl
Marx. For Marx, human freedom would only be achieved when man
gained control of those social forces which, as products of his own
creation, hadworked to dominate and control him.Alienationwould
be overcome, and freedom achieved, only when the autonomous life
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of social objects and forces was destroyed. This would be accom-
plished under socialism, when we would see the conscious, purpo-
sive ordering of production by the producers. As Marx put it in
Capital, ‘‘the life process of society, which is based on the process
of material production, does not strip off its mystical veil until it is
treated as production by freely associated men, and is consciously
regulated by them in accordance with a settled plan.’’5 Hayek’s lib-
eralism suggests that this hope is delusory. Man will never acquire
the capacity to control or redesign society because of the limited
powers of human reason. The fact that no single mind can know
more than a fraction of what is known to all individual minds sets
limits to the extent to which conscious direction can improve upon
the results of unconscious social processes. Liberalism as a social
philosophy, in Hayek’s conception, rests on this understanding of
the ‘‘spontaneous’’ character of social processes. Any answer to the
question of what are the best social and political arrangements for
human beingsmust be based on this understanding. The answer that
Hayek gives is that human relations should be governed by arrange-
ments which preserve liberty, with liberty understood as ‘‘independ-
ence of the arbitrary will of another.’’6 More precisely, Hayek argues
that a liberal society is one governed by the rule of law, and that
justice is served only if the law operates to delimit the scope of
individual freedom. In short, liberalism upholds the idea of a free
society in which individual conduct is regulated by rules of justice so
that each may pursue his own ends or purposes in peace.
The ideal of equality has a place in this scheme of things only
insofar as Hayek concedes that ‘‘The great aim of the struggle for
liberty has been equality before the law.’’7 Individual differences
provide no reason for the government to treat them differently:
‘‘people should be treated alike in spite of the fact that they are
different.’’8 What has to be recognized, however, is that this cannot
but lead to inequality in the actual positions people occupy. The
equality before the law which freedom requires leads to material
inequality. Hayek’s argument is that ‘‘though where the state must
use coercion for other reasons, it should treat all people alike, the
desire of making people more alike in their condition cannot be
accepted in a free society as a justification for further and discrim-
inatory coercion.’’9 His objection is not to equality as such, but to all
attempts to impose upon society a chosen pattern of distribution.
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The objection to institutions for the distribution of goods accord-
ing tomerit is of a similar nature. If the principle of reward according
to merit were to be accepted as the just foundation for the distribu-
tion of incomes, for example, we would end up with attempts to
control remuneration that would, in their turn, create the necessity
for even more controls on human activity.10 ‘‘This would produce a
kind of society which in all essential respects would be the opposite
of a free society – a society in which authority decided what the
individual was to do and how he was to do it.’’11
The fear of this outcome is also the basis for rejecting demands for
equal distribution based on the contention that membership in a
particular community or nation entitles the individual to a particular
material standard that is determined by the general wealth of the
group to which he belongs. Membership of some national commun-
ity does not, in Hayek’s liberalism, confer rights or entitlements to
any sort of share of national wealth. ‘‘The recognition of such claims
on a national scale would in fact only create a kind of collective (but
not less exclusive) property right in the resources of the nation that
could not be justified on the same grounds as individual property.’’12
Moreover, the result of such recognition would be that, ‘‘Rather than
admit people to the advantages that living in their country offers, a
nation will prefer to keep them out altogether.’’13
The liberal ideal, in Hayek’s conception, has no room for such
nationalist sentiments. On the contrary, it must resist them. Indeed,
it is a characteristic of the liberalism Hayek upholds, and which he
describes as ‘‘liberalism in the English sense,’’ that it is ‘‘generally
opposed to centralization, to nationalism and to socialism.’’14
There is, of course, more to Hayek’s liberalism than this brief
outline reveals. To understand the character of this liberal philoso-
phy more fully, however, requires a deeper investigation not only of
its tenets but also of its origins.
THE GENESIS OF HAYEK’S LIBERAL COMMITMENTS
A little has now been written about the intellectual origins of
Hayek’s ideas. Hayek himself has discussed his indebtedness to ear-
lier economists of the Austrian School – including, most famously,
Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich von Wieser, and Carl Menger.15 And
Jeremy Shearmur has investigated aspects of Hayek’s intellectual
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background in a number of papers, as well as in his study of Hayek’s
thought.16 We also have two popular biographies of Hayek by Alan
Ebenstein, as well as Bruce Caldwell’s magisterial study of the ori-
gins and development of Hayek’s economic thinking.17 Yet to under-
stand Hayek’s liberalism, it is important to understand not only its
origins in the world of European ideas, but also its genesis in Hayek’s
life and, more particularly, in his practical concerns.
Hayek’s first major political work, The Road to Serfdom, was not
published until 1944. By this time Hayek, having turned forty-five,
was an established scholar, a Fellow of the British Academy, and an
economist whose reputation had rivaled that of Keynes. We need to
askwhat it was that prompted an economist whose original interests
lay in trade-cycle research to turn his attention to political theory –
and, indeed, to devote himself to political theory for the next forty-
five years.
An important part of the answer to this question is that it was not
his theoretical preoccupations that led him to his political writings
but his practical ones. In the 1930s, observing the Nazis’ seizure of
power, Hayek clearly became increasingly concerned about political
developments in Europe. In his own terms, he saw ‘‘civilization’’
coming under threat from two significant forces: nationalism and
totalitarianism. The danger lay not merely in the victory of a parti-
cular political party but in the victory of ideaswhich had the capacity
to undermine European civilization. By the time war erupted in
September 1939, Hayek had some clearly formulated views about
the nature of the problem, and about how it had to be confronted.
Addressing the problem was something that dominated Hayek’s
intellectual and political energies for the next twenty years – up
until the publication in 1960 of The Constitution of Liberty.
The problem, as Hayek perceived it, was how to combat the ideas
that provided the basis for totalitarian institutions. The answer, he
thought, would have to involve at once subjecting those ideas to
sustained criticism, and developing and promoting the liberal alter-
native. It is very important to note here two things: first, Hayek did
not see this as essentially or primarily a philosophical task, but
rather as an intellectual task which required the contribution not
only of philosophers but also of economists and other social scien-
tists, as well as (perhaps most importantly) historians. Second,
Hayek believed quite firmly that for this task to meet with success
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it was necessary that the battle of ideas be engaged not merely in
academia but in the broader public realm.
These points come out very clearly in some correspondence
between Hayek and the British Broadcasting Service less than a
week after the declaration of war following the German invasion of
Poland. On September 9, 1939Hayek wrote to Mr. F.W. Ogilvie of the
BBC offering to help with its propaganda broadcasts into Germany.18
Enclosed was an additional memorandum (dated September 1939)
entitled ‘‘Some Notes on Propaganda in Germany.’’19 Hayek also
wrote to the Director General of the Ministry of Information,20
again enclosing his memorandum on propaganda in Germany, and
to the Minister of Information, Lord Macmillan,21 offering his serv-
ices as a propagandist.
The advice Hayek offered in his ‘‘Notes on Propaganda’’ is instruc-
tive. The purpose of the propaganda, he thought, should be to defend
and explain the principles of liberal democracy. To be effective it
would have to show how the principles that Great Britain and France
stood for were also those held dear by the great German poets and
thinkers. He also stressed that accuracy was vital: the German peo-
ple were largely ignorant of the more discreditable acts of the Nazi
regime and needed to be made aware of the facts in a sober, dispas-
sionate, and matter-of-fact way. That this process of ‘‘propaganda’’
seemed too academic, he thought, did not matter. The important
thing to do was to tell the truth, to admit mistakes when they were
made, and to be sober and accurate in a way that Nazi propaganda
was not.22
Hayek’s advocacy has two interesting features. First, it is persis-
tent: indeed, he felt strongly enough about the problem to continue
the correspondence into 1940 (at one point warning that he would
continue to make a nuisance of himself until the BBC got it right!).
Second, it betrays a very strong conviction that for propaganda to be
effective it must be truthful and accurate. Thus in a letter to Ogilvie
on September 22, 1939 he expressed distress at hearing the current
anti-Nazi broadcasts, stressed again the need for propaganda telling
Germanswhat had been happening inGermany since 1933, and recom-
mended establishing a committee of British, German, and neutral
scholars to do this.23 When a Major Gifford wrote to Hayek saying
that the value of the creation of a commission would not be in
proportion to the size of the ‘‘machinery’’ needed to set it up, he
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responded that the only way to convince Germans was by presenting
not just examples ofNazi crimes but details, names, and overwhelm-
ing evidence – enough to persuade them of the terrible nature of the
regime.24
What is also revealing about this correspondence, however, is
Hayek’s practical interest in Germany and its fate. His concern
was not simply how propaganda might best be employed to sap
German morale and to weaken its capacity to sustain a war effort –
though that may well have been important. The problem for him
was how to strengthen the internal forces of German resistance to
Nazism. As the war wore on, and it became clear (at least to Hayek)
that Germany was going to be crushed, it became even more
important in his mind that something be done to recover and
restore German moral and intellectual life. However, Hayek’s con-
cern was not simply for Germany’s own well-being. The fate of
Germany was entangled with the fortunes of Europe, and Germany
could not be lost if Europe was to survive the war. This concern
was presented very clearly in a paper Hayek read to the Political
Society at King’s College, Cambridge University, on February 28,
1944. There he wrote:
Whether we shall be able to rebuild something like a common European
civilization after this war will be decided mainly by what happens in the
years immediately following it. It is possible that the events that will accom-
pany the collapse of Germany will cause such destruction as to remove
the whole of Central Europe for generations or perhaps permanently from
the orbit of European civilization. It seems unlikely that, if this happens, the
developments can be confined to Central Europe; and if the fate of Europe
should be to relapse into barbarism, though ultimately a new civilization
may emerge from it, it is not likely that this country would escape the
consequences. The future of England is tied up with the future of Europe,
and, whether we like it or not, the future of Europe will largely be decided by
what will happen in Germany. Our efforts at least must be directed towards
regaining Germany for those values on which European civilization was
built and which alone can form the basis from which we can move towards
the realization of the ideals which guide us.25
Hayek’s concern at this point was that certain moral ideals were in
danger of being lost, particularly in Germany, and that the effects of
this loss would be to push people into nationalist camps that would
provide harbor for totalitarian ideas. What was needed, he thought,
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was the reassertion and reestablishment of those moral ideas that
were antithetical to totalitarianism.
But it would not be enough to pursue this task in a single country.
In the case of Germany the problemwas that Nazism had left behind
a ‘‘moral and intellectual desert’’ in which the ‘‘many oases, some
very fine, [were] almost completely isolated from each other.’’26 The
absence of any common tradition – beyond opposition to the Nazis
and to communism – made it difficult for people of good will to
accomplish very much: ‘‘nothing will probably be more conspicuous
than the powerlessness of good intentions without the uniting ele-
ment of those commonmoral and political traditions which we take
for granted, but which in Germany a complete break of a dozen years
has destroyed, with a thoroughness which few people in this country
can imagine.’’27 For this reason it was important that Germany be
brought back into the fold of European civilization, so that it might
draw upon the resources of that wider tradition. Isolation could have
disastrous consequences. (After the FirstWorldWar, Hayek suggests,
‘‘the expulsion of all Germans from several learned societies and
their exclusion from certain international scientific congresses was
among the strongest of the forces which drove many German schol-
ars into the nationalist camp.’’)28
Having made these points in an academic paper, however, Hayek
then took up the task of finding practical means of reintegrating
Germany into European cultural life. His Cambridge paper was
sent out to a number of academics and public figures,29 seeking
comments on his proposals for the reintegration of Germany.
Moreover, he raised the idea of establishing an international society
to the furtherance of this end.
The difficulty of persuading others to join in such an endeavor at
the time should not be underestimated.Michael Polanyi, for example,
wrote back expressing his unwillingness to meet other Germans –
saying that he could forgive but not forget.30 And Hayek was well
aware of the suspicion with which Germany and Germans had come
to be regarded – as he makes clear in a review published in March
1945, ‘‘Is There a German nation?’’ The review begins: ‘‘Difficult as it
is for the ordinaryman to believe that all he has heard of theGermans
can be true, it becomes almost impossible for those who have direct
acquaintance with a particular side of German life.’’31And once again
Hayek argued that most Germans approved of little in Hitler’s
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program but were taken in by appeals to nationalist sentiment, and
that the problem this has created can be remedied only by a concerted
effort on the part of Europeans to put ‘‘the common house in order.’’32
Whatever the difficulties, Hayek set about trying to organize an
international society of liberal-minded intellectuals. He was able
eventually to raise the money to fund a meeting of sympathetic
scholars in April 1947 – a meeting that saw the founding of the
Mont Pe`lerin Society. But a great deal of Hayek’s energies between
the publication of The Road to Serfdom in 1944 and the formation of
theMont Pe`lerin Societywere spentworking toward or arguing for the
reintegration of German scholarship – and particularly historical
scholarship – into the intellectual life of Europe.
Hayek’s writings and activities in this period covering the rise
and fall of Nazi Germany are important because they reveal how
much his efforts as a political theorist emerge out of the worries
and fears of an active public intellectual. Especially revealing is his
‘‘Memorandum on the Proposed Foundation of an International
Academy for Political Philosophy tentatively called ‘The Acton–
Tocqueville Society.’ ’’ Dated 1945, it sets out Hayek’s basic proposals
to bringGerman scholars andGerman cultural life back into the fold,
to fight ‘‘totalitarianism,’’ and to preserve the liberal tradition. The
tone of the memorandum is one of anxious urgency, as is made clear
in the opening paragraph:
In large parts of the European Continent the former common civilization
is in danger of immediate disintegration. In the rest of the Western World,
where it still seems secure, many of the basic values on which it is founded
are already threatened. Even among those who are aware of these dangers
there exists an uncertainty of aim and a lack of assured basic convictions
which makes their isolated endeavours to stem the tide largely ineffective.
The most sinister sign is a widespread fatalism, a readiness to treat as
inevitable tendencies that are merely the results of human decisions, and a
belief that ourwishes canhave no power to avert the fatewhich an inexorable
law of historical development has decreed for us. If we are not to drift into a
statewhich nobodywants, there is clearly urgent need for a common effort at
reconsideration of ourmoral and political values, a sorting out of thosewhich
must in all circumstances be preserved and never sacrificed or endangered
for some other ‘‘advances,’’ and a deliberate effort to make people aware of
the values which they take for granted as the air they breathe and which
may yet be endangered if no deliberate effort is made to preserve them.33
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Throughout the memorandum Hayek expresses his concern that,
even after victory in war, the situation is precarious because total-
itarian ideas have gained a foothold and amighty effort is still needed
to combat their influence. This comes out even more clearly in
a second memorandum, probably written in 1946, entitled ‘‘The
Prospects of Freedom.’’34 Here he quotes the words of ‘‘a great man
whom we have recently lost,’’ Lord Keynes, who had written of the
power of ideas, observing that ‘‘the world is ruled by little else,’’ and
that ‘‘it is ideas and not vested interests, which are dangerous for
good and evil.’’35 Hayek was entirely in agreement with Keynes on
this point, and this also helps account for his eagerness to get onwith
the task of developing alternatives to totalitarian ideas – particularly
since there was always a lengthy ‘‘interval between the time when
ideas are given currency and the time when they govern action.’’36
So it is out of his anxiety and fears about the future of Europe and
modern civilization, and a conviction that that future depended upon
the salvaging of a tradition of humane values whose vitality had been
sapped by war and the influence of totalitarianism, that Hayek’s
liberal social and political philosophy emerges. And this, I think,
accounts for a number of important and persistent features of his
thought. First, it accounts for Hayek’s repeated attempts to restate
the principles of liberalism rather than to offer a new liberal theory.
The Constitution of Liberty opens with the words: ‘‘If old truths
are to retain their hold on men’s minds, they must be restated
in the language and concepts of successive generations.’’ And
Law, Legislation, and Liberty is, in a similar vein, subtitled A New
Statement of the Liberal Principles of Justice and Political Economy.
In these, and other, works Hayek sees himself not as setting out to
devise a new theory of justice or social order de novo, but as seeking
to keep alive and refine a tradition of ideas of whose importance as a
bulwark against totalitarianism he was profoundly convinced. It is
his concern with the moral and spiritual37 threat of totalitarianism
over and above any concern with abstract philosophical problems
of liberal theory that also shapes his attempt to draw, through
his restatements, as many sympathizers as possible into the liberal
camp. Thus, in his first ‘‘Memorandum on the Proposed Foundation
of an International Academy,’’ he asserts that although ‘‘Without
some . . . common basis no fruitful discussion of the problems
with which we are concerned is possible, . . . within these limits
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there ought to be room for many shades of opinion from, to mention
only two instances, some ‘liberal socialists’ at one end to some
‘liberal catholics’ on the other. The group should, in other words,
combine all people who are united in the opposition to totalitarian-
ism of any kind.’’38 Hayek’s ambition has not been to redefine the
liberal tradition but to halt the drift of people away from it.39
Secondly, Hayek’s anxieties about totalitarianism help to account
for his interpretation of liberalism as an outlook at whose heart is a
refusal to seek to control or shape human development. The idea of
providing society with a ‘‘conscious’’ direction toward a particular
aim is what, in Hayek’s thinking, unites collectivist doctrines such
as fascism and communism which, in seeking to organize society,
refuse ‘‘to recognize autonomous spheres in which the ends of the
individuals are supreme’’; and these doctrines are ‘‘totalitarian.’’40
Liberalism is, therefore, presented as a tradition that recognizes the
significance of human ignorance, and appreciates that civilization
is something which emerges without the help of a designing mind.
Indeed, Hayek tries to argue, particularly in The Constitution of
Liberty, that civilization’s creative powers depend upon social pro-
cesses not being brought within the control of human reason.41
Thirdly, Hayek’s concerns about the influence of totalitarianism
and the dangers facing European civilization account for the persis-
tent internationalist – and anti-nationalist – character of his liberal
thought. This is where Hayek’s thought is, perhaps, most distinctive
within – and out of step with – modern liberalism. Early on in his
assessment of the problem of totalitarianismHayek decided that the
threat it posed could only bemet by an international movement, and
that a relapse into national isolationism would be fatal for free
societies and give succor to collectivist forces. This is why he
asked, as early as 1939:
But nowwhennationalism and socialismhave combined – not only in name –
into a powerful organization which threatens the liberal democracies, and
when, even within these democracies, the socialists are becoming steadily
more nationalist and the nationalists steadily more socialist, is it too much
to hope for a rebirth of real liberalism, true to its ideal of freedom and
internationalism. . .?42
But if these concerns are what have shaped Hayek’s thinking, they
are alsowhat have kept him in importantways out of stepwithmuch
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of contemporary liberal thought. To understand why this has been
so, however, requires a closer look at recent developments in liberal
theory.
CONTEMPORARY LIBERAL THEORY
Liberal theory, over the past quarter-century, has been dominated by
the work of John Rawls. For the most part, political theorists have
approached liberalism by considering the problems, methods, and
conclusions developed by Rawls in A Theory of Justice. The litera-
ture reveals two major concerns among political philosophers. The
first is with the substantive question of the nature of the just regime,
which leads these writers to ask what is the proper role of govern-
ment, what rights individuals have, and how the benefits and bur-
dens of social life should be distributed. The second concern has been
with the procedural or methodological problem of justifying such
arrangements. The two concerns are not always easily distinguished,
however, since methodological strictures are often adopted because
they lead to certain substantive conclusions – or, at least, rule out
others.
The debates over these questions have focused for much of the
time on the issue of ‘‘neutrality.’’Many have argued that neutrality is
fundamental to liberalism. Two kinds of claims have been asserted.
The first is that the liberal statemust exemplify neutrality inasmuch
as its laws must not prefer any particular conception of the good life
as superior to others: the various conceptions of the good to be found
in a pluralist society must be accorded equal respect. ‘‘Liberalism
dictates official neutrality among the projects to which individuals
might come to commit themselves.’’43 The second claim is that the
principles governing a liberal polity must be principles chosen under
‘‘neutral’’ conditions: they must be principles whose selection is not
determined by any particular conception of the good life, even
though the principles themselves will rule out some ways of life
(indeed, they would be pointless if they did not). Rawls’ original
theory is most readily interpreted in this way.
Yet many liberals have rejected neutrality as unattractive or phil-
osophically unpersuasive. William Galston, for example, has argued
that a coherent defense of liberalism requires a stonger commitment
to a particular, liberal, conception of the good life; and Stephen
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Macedo has tried to show that a liberal regime presupposes the
existence (and encourages the development) of distinctively liberal
virtues.44 For the most part, however, criticisms of neutrality have
come from critics of liberalism,who see the idea of state neutrality as
neither attainable nor desirable, and procedural neutrality as philo-
sophically incoherent. These critics have challenged liberalism’s
fundamental assumptions, arguing that any plausible conception of
a political order cannot aspiremerely to neutrality among competing
conceptions of the good life. A society, they insist, is more than an
association of individuals bound together by contractual ties; it is
a community that coheres because people share common practices
and beliefs. At some deep level, they suggest, people must share an
understanding of the character of the good life if they are to be able
to associate in human communities. Politics is not simply about
protecting or enforcing individual rights but about securing the
common good. And they emphasize that we cannot justify political
arrangements without referring to common purposes or ends.
This challenge from the so-called communitarian critics45 of lib-
eralism has had a substantial impact on contemporary liberal theory.
It has persuaded some that, if liberalism is defensible, it can only be
so for existing liberal societies, which should endorse the practices
and values of their own traditions.46To a significant extent it has also
persuaded Rawls to re-present his own theory of justice as a response
to certain important features of the modern world – notably, its
pluralism and its religious diversity. In Political Liberalism (Rawls
1993), the principles of justice as fairness are offered as the basis for
securing an ‘‘overlapping consensus’’ which would make for the
stability and social unity of a democratic regime.
In the discussions and debates over the basis and the content of
liberal theory, it would be fair to say, the dominant issues have
concerned the moral foundations of liberalism. Or, to put the matter
less grandly, liberal theorists have focused on the moral justification
for particular social entitlements and obligations of governments and
individuals within a democratic state. In all of this, a number of
presuppositions about the important concerns of theory ought to
be recognized. First, it is assumed that pluralism is a significant –
perhaps the most important – issue, since there are within a society
different conceptions of the good associated with different ways of
life or preferences. Second, it is assumed that the question of how to
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deal with pluralism is raised – and must be handled – within the
context of existing states, which are treated, for the purpose of argu-
ment, as closed societies. Indeed, the question posed is often: what
should the government do? Third, questions concerning the institu-
tional arrangements appropriate for a liberal society are not generally
approached. Rawls, for example explicitly set aside the question of
what kind of economic system was appropriate if society were to be
governed by his principles of justice. Issues of institutional design are
typically left out of consideration: questions about the structure of
authority and the mechanisms necessary for its operation and its
delimitation (for example, federalism, the division of legislative
and executive powers, independent associations within civil society)
are not discussed by Rawls, nor, for that matter, by most prominent
liberal writers.47
What all this amounts to is a liberal theory whose style and
preoccupations are a good way from Hayek’s method and indeed
from his very concerns. First, for Hayek the main problem confront-
ing the modern world was not diversity or pluralism but total-
itarianism. Diversity, far from being a problem, was potentially a
solution – provided the right institutions were in place. Secondly,
Hayek refused to theorize on the basis of a working assumption that
society was a closed system whose internal principles of justice
might usefully be specified before theory was extended into the
international realm. For Hayek, liberalism was not merely a univer-
salist creed but an internationalist one which did not recognize the
moral significance of national boundaries. Thus Hayek tries to
develop an account of liberalism as the tradition of the Open
Society. This is not to say that Hayek ignores the existence of
national boundaries; it is rather that his theory recognizes national
states not as presupposed by liberalism but as problemswhich liberal
theorymust deal with. Thirdly, then, Hayek places great importance
on problems of social theory which liberalism must address if its
general concerns are to be met.
Seen in this light, it is not surprising that Hayek and contempo-
rary liberal theory have failed to engage or connect. This is a pity
because Hayek hasmore to offer thanmodern liberals have generally
recognized. We should turn then to look in more detail at what
Hayek has to say to appreciate better his contribution to modern
liberalism.
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HAYEK AND MODERN LIBERALISM
The motivation for Hayek’s efforts to defend liberal principles, as
we saw earlier, was a concern about the state of the postwar world.
Hayek’s fear was that the forces of nationalism and separatism
could still triumph, and destroy modern civilization. The only way
to combat these forces was with the ideas which were their antith-
esis: the universalist, egalitarian, and libertarian ideas of liberalism.
To espouse these ideas was to espouse the idea of an ‘‘abstract
order.’’ This point is especially important for Hayek, for he noted
very early that if moral values were to be shared across a wide range
of people, the scope for agreement on substantive questions would be
reduced. This, he argued in Law, Legislation, and Liberty, was one of
the reasons why liberal ideas were difficult to defend.
‘‘The resistance against the new morals of the Open Society was
strengthened also by the realization that it not only indefinitely
enlarged the circle of other people in relation to whom one had to
obey moral rules, but that this extension of the scope of the moral
code necessarily brought with itself a reduction of its content.’’48The
human craving would always be for a more personal, a more parti-
cularistic, morals. In Hayek’s terms, there is a fundamental conflict
between tribal morals and universal justice which has manifested
itself throughout history ‘‘in a recurrent clash between the sense of
loyalty and that of justice.’’49
Nonetheless, the nature of the extended society as an abstract
order, Hayek thinks, has to be recognized. An abstract order is one
governed by abstract rules of just conduct. Abstract rules of just
conduct are so called because when they come into dispute the
issue is settled by appealing to other rules that share some abstract
features with the present issue. Disputes are thus settled without
any appeal to, or agreement about, the importance of the particular
aims pursued by the disputing parties.50The persistent application of
abstract rules over time produces an abstract order which, as awhole,
serves no particular end, but which nevertheless facilitates the
peaceful pursuit of diverse ends. The nature of the extended society
as an abstract order has to be explicitly recognized, however, because
it must be understood that this order is not a community. The
abstract order is Hayek’s term to characterize what he otherwise
calls the Open Society or the Great Society. And his writings in
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general counsel against attempting to turn this kind of society into
a community in which substantive or concrete goals or purposes are
held in common. This would be a danger to liberty; worse, ‘‘all
attempts to model the Great Society on the image of the familiar
small group, or to turn it into a community by directing the individ-
uals towards common visible purposes, must produce a totalitarian
society.’’51
There are two other related reasons why Hayek is so insistent in
his work on the importance of not closing the borders of the Open
Society to turn it into a community, and of not going down the path
of nationalism. The first has to do with Hayek’s views about the
growth of knowledge. The expansion and development of human
knowledge he thinks is generally stifled by attempts to control it or
direct it. The growth of knowledge is greatest when spontaneous
interaction among individuals and institutions to solve problems of
adaptation leads to solutions which were unforeseen and unex-
pected.52 The threat to this process comes from attempts to organize
the social process; and the greatest attempt – and threat – comes from
the state. ‘‘In the past, the spontaneous forces of growth, however
much restricted, could usually still assert themselves against the
organized coercion of the state.’’53 But the fear Hayek expresses is
that, with the development of the technological means of control
available to government, the balance of power may change. ‘‘We are
not far from the point where the deliberately organized forces of
society may destroy those spontaneous forces which have made
advance possible.’’54 The restriction of human interaction within
the confines of state borders in the name of community is thus
something Hayek views with suspicion, if not alarm.
The second reason for Hayek’s insistence on the importance of
keeping open the Open Society and avoiding the nationalist road
has to do with his sympathy with Lord Acton’s views on nation-
alism and the state, and his hostility to John Stuart Mill’s. In his
Considerations of Representative GovernmentMill had argued that
‘‘It is in general a necessary condition of free institutions that the
boundaries of government should coincide in the main with those of
nationalities.’’55 ForHayek, one of the problemswithMill was that he
had acceptedmore of nationalist doctrines than was compatible with
his liberal program. Acton, however, had seen more clearly that
liberty required diversity rather than uniformity – or even consensus.
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He had argued, rightly, that ‘‘the combination of different nations
in one State is as necessary a condition of civilized life as the combi-
nation of men in society,’’ and that ‘‘this diversity in the same State
is a firm barrier against the intention of the Government beyond
the political sphere which is common to all into the social depart-
ment which escapes legislation and is ruled by spontaneous laws.’’56
Diversity was the bulwark of resistance to social organization.
But the question is: how does one deal with the fact that the state
exists, and exists in the context of other states? Boundaries have
been, and will continue to be, drawn. What does liberalism have to
say about this? In Hayek’s view it has a good deal to say; and what it
has to say is largely in defense of the idea of interstate federation.
‘‘The idea of interstate federation as the consistent development of
the liberal point of view should be able to provide a new point d’appui
for all those liberals who have despaired of and deserted their creed
during the periods of wandering.’’57 So wrote Hayek in 1939, when he
was convinced that the rebirth of ‘‘real liberalism, true to the ideal of
freedom and internationalism’’ required the development of some
form of federal union of states. Hayek had a number of theoretical
arguments to advance in defense of this view; but his concerns were
also very much practical, particularly during the years surrounding
the war, and this is reflected in a number of writings of this period. It
is worth looking at both dimensions to understand why Hayek saw
liberal ideas as the great hope for European civilization, and why he
saw federalism as an integral part of them.
The clearest application of federalist ideas to the solution of prac-
tical problems is to be seen in Hayek’s assessment of what to do about
the problem of Germany, whose return to the fold of European civi-
lization, as we have already noted, he thought vitally important for
everyone. In an essay entitled ‘‘A Plan for the Future of Germany’’ he
suggested that there were three aspects to the long-term policy prob-
lemof guiding theGermans back: political, economic, and educational
or psychological.58 The political problem was largely one of directing
Germanambitions away from the ideal of a highly centralizedGerman
Reich unified for common action. But here there was a dilemma:
The direct method of breaking Germany into parts and prohibiting their
reunion would almost certainly fail in the long run. It would be the surest
way to reawaken the most violent nationalism and to make the creation of
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a reunified and centralized Germany the main ambition of all Germans. We
should be able to prevent this for some time. But in the long run no measure
will succeed which does not rest on the acquiescence of the Germans; and it
surelymust be our fundamentalmaxim that any successful settlementmust
have a chance of continuing when we are no longer ready to maintain it by
the continuous exercise of force.59
In Hayek’s view, there was only one solution to this dilemma. This
would involve, in the first instance, placing Germany’s common
central government under Allied control, but making clear to the
Germans that they could progressively escape this control by devel-
oping representative and democratic institutions on a smaller scale
in the individual states of which the Reich was composed. Over
time, however, all these states would, at varying rates, earn their
emancipation from direct Allied control and the Allied control
would become more and more like that of a ‘‘government of a feder-
ation or even of a confederation.’’60 Moreover, Hayek thought, it
would be preferable if, upon emancipation, the German states had
the option of joining some other federation of European states that
was ready to receive them. In the course of time, he suggested, they
might become a part of a much more comprehensive European fed-
eration which included France and Italy.61 The aim would be to so
‘‘entangle’’ the states with their non-German neighbors that they
would become ‘‘far from anxious once again to merge their individ-
uality in a highly centralized Reich.’’62Apolicy of crucial importance
here is free trade. This is not for the economic benefits it would bring
but because giving the power of foreign trade to the states would give
them too much power over the economic system. And to retain a
common tariff system for the whole of Germany’s economic system
would build up a highly centralized and self-sufficient system –
which was precisely what had to be prevented.63
Whatever the merits or difficulties of Hayek’s practical proposals,
they do reveal some important general concerns, and a view about
the desirable course of liberalism. His most general concern was
undoubtedly the danger of the rebirth of a powerful totalitarian
state. The solution was to decentralize power through the develop-
ment of federal institutions. And he clearly thought that ‘‘an essen-
tially liberal economic regime [was] a necessary condition for the
success of any interstate federation.’’64 Butmore importantly, he also
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thought, and argued explicitly, that the converse was no less true:
‘‘the abrogation of national sovereignties and the creation of an
effective international order of law is a necessary complement and
the logical consummation of the liberal program.’’65
These matters are addressed most directly by Hayek in his essay
on ‘‘The Economic Conditions of Interstate Federalism.’’ Here he
makes plain that the ‘‘main purpose of interstate federation is to
secure peace: to prevent war between the parts of the federation by
eliminating causes of friction between them and by providing effec-
tive machinery for the settlement of any disputes which may arise
between them and to prevent war between the federation and any
independent states by making the former so strong as to eliminate
any danger of attack fromwithout.’’66To achieve this, federation had
to involve not only political but also economic union. The most
important reason for this was that economic seclusion or isolation
of any state within a union would produce a solidarity of interests
among the inhabitants of that state, and conflicts with the interests
of other states.
Economic frontiers create communities of interest on a regional basis and of
a most intimate character: they bring it about that all conflicts of interests
tend to become conflicts between the same groups of people, instead of
conflicts between groups of constantly varying composition, and that there
will in consequence be perpetual conflicts between the inhabitants of a state
as such instead of between the various individuals themselves arrayed,
sometimes with one group of people against another, and at other times on
another issue with the second group against the first.67
The removal of economic barriers would do a great deal to reduce the
potential for conflict.
Political union and the abrogation of national sovereignty, on the
other hand, would work to reduce the scope of intervention in eco-
nomic activity. Planning or central direction of economic activity
presupposes the existence of common values, ‘‘and the degree to
which planning can be carried is limited to the extent to which
agreement on such a common scale of values can be obtained or
enforced.’’68 Diversity within a federation, however, would militate
against the sharing of common substantive values to any extent that
would make extensive planning possible. And this would offer cer-
tain safeguards for individual freedom.
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All this is possible, however, only if there iswidespread agreement
on some values. These are the values which lie at the core of liberal
political philosophy, and which include the respect for the idea of
individual freedom and an opposition to totalitarianism. Federation
would not be possible without some minimal level of acceptance of
these values. Indeed, it is questionable whether a voluntary federa-
tion of non-liberal states would be at all possible. For this reason it
was important not only towork to secure the conditionswhichmade
consensus on substantive goals or ends on the national level less
likely, but also to secure widespread acceptance of the fundamental
principles of liberalism across all boundaries. This, of necessity,
meant presenting liberalism as an ideal that was in no way confined
in its outlook to the interests of nations or national groups. It would
be best to present it as what it was: a doctrine of individual liberty.
While the plausibility and consistency of Hayek’s arguments
ought not to be taken for granted – and important criticisms have
been made of a number of aspects of Hayek’s liberalism – it is, none-
theless, worth noting why they should be taken seriously and why
his work is deserving of closer study.69
Hayek’s liberalism repays examination, first, because it mounts
a comprehensive attempt to address a large range of complex and
interrelated problems in moral, social, and political theory. More
seriously than any other liberal thinker sinceWeber, he has grappled
with the difficulties confronting liberalism as a philosophical doc-
trine in a world in which ethical demands have often come into
conflict with economic and political reality. Hayek has certainly
addressed the ethical problems of liberty and justice; but he has
attempted to deal with them not as isolated philosophical problems
but in relation to issues of social and economic organization, and
problems of national and international political conflict. In this
respect his work presents an important challenge to contemporary
liberal theory, which has, for much of the past thirty years, been
locked in abstract discussions of liberalism’s moral foundations and
has neglected to relate these questions to institutional issues.
Secondly,Hayek’s views should be considered because, in address-
ing institutional questions, he has notmade themistake of confining
the problems of liberalism within national boundaries. The ques-
tion is not: what should a liberal democratic regime do? Nor is it:
what should be the institutions of a liberal democratic society?
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The question is: what are the appropriate institutions if the most
important liberal values are to survive? Fundamental discussion of
the nature, role, and authority of the state should be addressed from
this standpoint. Hayek has accurately perceived that, in the modern
world,moral, economic, and political systems donot – indeed, cannot –
exist in isolation. His social philosophy thus attempts to address
questions of moral, economic, and political theory in a way which
takes this fact as an important given. In some ways it might be said
that Hayek’s work as a political thinker and activist has been intended
to recover and strengthen the liberal tradition by building a coalition –
or an overlapping consensus – of ideas which might nourish it. That
consensus, however, was always, in his mind, an international con-
sensus since the traditions of liberalism were themselves fundamen-
tally not nationalist.
Finally, then, Hayek should be taken seriously because he has
correctly identified as the most serious problems confronting civili-
zation in the twentieth century the problems of nationalism and
totalitarianism. Even with the dereliction of European communism
at the end of the twentieth century, the problems which remain or
are reemerging in the shape of ethnic conflict, separatist national
movements, and regional trading blocs stem from practices and ideas
which the liberal tradition has consistently criticized: ideas hostile
to individualist, universalist, and egalitarianmoral principles.While
thinkers like Hannah Arendt have also recognized the threat and
moral danger posed by totalitarianism, it is in Hayek’s work that we
have the most thorough attempt to understand the logic of its insti-
tutional alternative.
NOTES
1. See for example the work of David Miller (1989b) arguing for a form of
‘‘market socialism.’’
2. See for example Stockman 1986.
3. None of the so-called communitarian critics of liberalism have taken
Hayek to be an important target. An interesting exception is Crowley
(1987), although this work focuses on Hayek and Sidney and Beatrice
Webb, and argues (mistakenly, in my view) that they share premises
which compromise their different liberal theories.
4. I borrow this phrasing from Larmore 1987, p. 107.
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5. Marx 1967, p. 80.
6. Hayek 1960, p. 12.
7. Hayek 1960, p. 85.
8. Hayek 1960, p. 86.
9. Hayek 1960, p. 87.
10. This is a point David Hume recognized in his Enquiries Concerning the
Principles of Morals, where he writes: ‘‘The most rigorous inquisition
too is requisite to watch every inequality on its first appearance; and the
most severe jurisdiction, to punish and redress it . . . so much authority
must soon degenerate into tyranny, and be exerted with great partial-
ities’’ (1976, p. 194).
11. Hayek 1960, p. 100.
12. Hayek 1960, p. 101.
13. Hayek 1960, p. 101.
14. Hayek [1946] 1948, p. 28.
15. See Hayek 1992, part I, especially Hayek’s essays on ‘‘The Economics
of the 1920s as Seen from Vienna’’ and ‘‘The Austrian School of
Economics,’’ and also the essays on Carl Menger, Friedrich von Wieser,
Ludwig von Mises, and Ernst Mach.
16. See for example Shearmur 1986.
17. See Ebenstein 2001 and 2003; Caldwell 2004a.
18. Letter toOgilvie is unpublished. Itmay be found in theHoover Institution,
Stanford University, Hayek Archive, box 61, folder 5.
19. Hoover Institution, Hayek Archive, box 61, folder 4.
20. Letter to Director General, Ministry of Information, September 9, 1939,
Hoover Institution, Hayek Archive, box 61, folder 5. Interestingly, Hayek
notes in this letter that the Austrian intelligentsia generally had, unfortu-
nately, been deluded by ‘‘Hitlerism’’ and could be of little help.
21. Letter to Macmillan, September 12, 1939, Hoover Institution, Hayek
Archive, box 61, folder 5.
22. ‘‘Some Notes on Propaganda in Germany,’’ Hoover Institution, Hayek
Archive, box 61, folder 4.
23. Letter to Ogilvie, September 22, 1939, Hoover Institution, HayekArchive,
box 61, folder 5. In another letter to Ogilvie sent on the same day Hayek
complained that BBC broadcasts were too mild – but argued against
violent and abusive broadcasts. Three weeks later, in a letter to Ogilvie
dated October 15, he noted the improvement in BBC propaganda broad-
casts, but argued that they could still be better. (For example, he argued
against using one of the voices which Germans might think sounded
Jewish.)
24. Letter to Major Gifford (Ministry of Information?), January 3, 1940,
Hoover Institution, Hayek Archive, box 61, folder 5.
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25. Hayek 1992, p. 201.
26. Hayek 1992, p. 202.
27. Hayek 1992, p. 202.
28. Hayek 1992, p. 207.
29. These included David Mathias, G.N. Clark, E. K. Bramstedt, Denis
Brogan, F.M. Stenton, Ernest Barker, Charles Welsley, G. P. Gooch,
E. L. Woodward, Michael Polanyi, G.M. Trevelyan, and Herbert
Butterfield, all of whom replied with comments on Hayek’s paper.
Their letters may be found in the Hoover Institution, Hayek Archive,
box 61, folder 7.
30. Letter from Polanyi to Hayek, July 11, 1944, Hoover Institution, Hayek
Archive, box 61, folder 7.
31. In Hayek 1992, pp. 219–22, at p. 219. The review, first published in Time
and Tide, March 24, 1945, was of Edmond Vermeil’s Germany’s Three
Reichs.
32. Hayek 1992, pp. 221–22.
33. Unpublished memorandum dated August 1945, London School of
Economics, pp. 1–13, at p. 1. The MSS is held at the Hoover Institution,
HayekArchive, box 61, folder 8. Marked ‘‘confidential,’’ thememorandum
was never published, although it was distributed among a number of
people sympathetic to Hayek’s efforts to form an international society.
34. In a letter to A. Hunold dated October 9, 1946, in which he was seeking
helpwith funding for his proposed international society,Hayek enclosed
copies of this and also his earliermemorandum for consideration. It may
be found in the Hoover Institution, Hayek Archive, box 61, folder 9.
35. Quoted in Hayek’s memorandum, ‘‘Prospects of Freedom,’’ at p. 2.
36. ‘‘Prospects of Freedom,’’ p. 3. Hayek continues: ‘‘It is usually a generation,
or even more, and that is one reason why on the one hand our present
thinking seems so powerless to influence events, andwhy on the other so
much well meant effort at political education and propaganda is mis-
spent, because it is almost invariably aimed at a short run effect.’’
37. It may seem like an exaggeration to suggest that Hayek saw totalitari-
anism as a spiritual threat. Yet this is precisely what he suggests in a
two-page ‘‘Explanatory Memorandum’’ he wrote for an International
Liberal Conference at Wadham College, Oxford, April 9–14, 1947.
Noting the decline of liberalism, the progress of collectivist ideas, and
the tendency ‘‘towards national isolationism and away from the broader
conception of international cooperation,’’ Hayek remarked that the
causes of this were deep. They lie less in the actions of rulers than in
‘‘amass retreat from the spirit and tradition of liberalismwhich has been
the ruling force in European civilization since the Middle Ages. The
conception of the free individual living in a free society, and of free
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societies working together for their mutual good is being replaced by the
doctrine of the compulsory subordination of the individual to the group,
and the consequent disintegration of the world into antagonistic soci-
eties. Men and women are losing faith in the old doctrine of personal
freedom coupled with personal responsibility, and are giving up their
hard-won right of personal choice in favour of communal control . . .The
crisis in human relationships is, therefore, largely a spiritual one, and is
less concerned with the activities of particular parties than with the
basic outlook on life of the average citizen.’’
38. ‘‘Memorandum on the Proposed Foundation of an International
Academy,’’ pp. 7–8.
39. This was essentially Hayek’s response to Pierre Goodrich’s criticisms of
a draft of The Constitution of Liberty. In a letter to Goodrich dated April
4, 1959 Hayek wrote: ‘‘I don’t think it is considerations of political expe-
diency or possibility or any temporizingwhichmakeme draw the line at
a point which admittedly still leavesmuch that I dislike inside the range
of the permissible. The fact is that in my present state of thinking I
cannot yet state with any clarity a general criterion which would
exclude all that I dislike. I believe much would be gained and further
drift prevented if agreement among sensible people could be achieved on
the criteria which I suggest, even if in the long run they should not be
proven altogether sufficient.’’
40. Hayek [1944] 1962, p. 42.
41. See especially ch. 2, ‘‘The Creative Powers of a Free Civilization.’’ Even
in 1946, in ‘‘Prospects of Freedom,’’ pp. 6–7, Hayek had lamented that
‘‘The current interpretation of recent history as much as the very lan-
guage in which we now discuss public affairs are so much permeated
with the conception that nothing can be satisfactory unless it is ‘con-
sciously controlled’ by some super-mind, that even if we to-day defeated
all the schemes for government control of economic life existing or
proposed, wewould to-morrow be faced by another crop, not less danger-
ous or harmful.’’
42. From Hayek [1939] 1948, pp. 270–1.
43. Lomasky 1987, p. 167.
44. See Galston 1992 and Macedo 1990.
45. The literature of communitarianism is voluminous. For a useful survey
see Mulhall and Swift 1992.
46. See for example, John Gray, who has argued this in Gray 1989.
47. In Rawls 2001, Rawls does indicate that his theory is incompatible with
certain kinds of institutional arrangements, including both free market
capitalism and the welfare state; and that he is most sympathetic to the
idea of a property-owning democracy.
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48. Hayek 1976b, p. 146.
49. Hayek 1976b, p. 147. This idea is also a guiding theme of Hayek 1988.
50. Hayek 1976b, p. 15.
51. Hayek 1976b, p. 147.
52. This is the general line of argument of ch. 2 of The Constitution of
Liberty, ‘‘The Creative Powers of a Free Civilization.’’ It is arguably a
general theme of the entire work; at one point Hayek contemplated
using the title of ch. 2 as the title (and later as the subtitle) of the book.
53. Hayek 1960, p. 38.
54. Hayek 1960, p. 38.
55. Quoted in Hayek [1939] 1948, p. 270n.
56. Acton, in The History of Freedom and Other Essays, quoted in Hayek
[1939] 1948, p. 270n.
57. Hayek [1939] 1948, p. 271.
58. First published, with the subtitle ‘‘Decentralization Offers Some Basis
for Independence,’’ in the Saturday Review of Literature, June 23, 1945,
pp. 7–9, 39–40; this reference to the reprinted essay in Hayek 1992,
pp. 223–36, at p. 223.
59. Hayek 1992, p. 225.
60. Hayek 1992, pp. 225–26.
61. Hayek 1992, p. 226.
62. Hayek 1992, p. 226.
63. Hayek 1992, p. 227. Compare Oakeshott’s observation: ‘‘But of all the
acquisitions of governmental power inherent in collectivism, that
which comes from its monopoly of foreign trade is, perhaps, the most
dangerous to liberty; for freedom of external trade is one of the most
effective safeguards a community may have against excessive power.
And just as the abolition of competition at home draws the government
into (and thus magnifies) every conflict, so collectivist trading abroad
involves the government in competitive commercial transactions and
increases the occasions and the severity of international disharmony.’’
See Oakeshott 1991, p. 400.
64. Hayek [1939] 1948, p. 269.
65. Hayek [1939] 1948, p. 269.
66. Hayek [1939] 1948, p. 255.
67. Hayek [1939] 1948, p. 257.
68. Hayek [1939] 1948, p. 264.
69. I have offered a detailed critique of Hayek’s political theory in Kukathas
1989; for a different, though no less critical, analysis, see Kley 1994.
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